Environmental policy has historically been
driven by a demand-side mindset -- attempting to limit consumption of precious
fossil fuels through pollution permits, taxation, and multi-national climate
change treaties.
However,
new research from the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University
suggests that actually buying coal, oil and other dirty fossil fuel deposits
still in the ground could be a far better way to fight climate change. The new
study: "Buy Coal!
A Case
for Supply-Side Environmental Policy," suggests that the single best
policy for a multi-national climate coalition is to purchase the extraction
rights of dirty fossil fuels in non-participating countries (also called
"third countries"), and then conserve rather than exploit the
deposits. According to the study's author, Bard Harstad, this would be a
radical departure from the traditional view that focuses on reducing the demand
for fuel.
"One
of the biggest challenges for multi-national climate agreements is the role of
non-participating countries. If a climate coalition reduces demand for fossil
fuel, the world price of oil goes down and non-participating countries find it
profitable to consume and pollute more. Similarly, if the coalition seeks to
reduce the supply or extraction of fossil fuels, the world price increases and
these countries find it optimal to supply more," said Harstad, associate
professor of managerial economics & decision sciences and Max McGraw Chair
in Management & Environment at the Kellogg School of Management.
"Thus, both on the demand-side and the supply-side the result is carbon
leakage, which is an increase in pollution abroad relative to the
emission-reduction at home. To limit carbon leakage, the coalition may set up
tariffs or other border measures, but this will distort trade."
"In
my analysis, I show that by letting coalition countries buy extraction rights
in third countries -- and preserve rather than exploit the fuel deposits --
climate coalitions can circumvent the traditional problems of a demand-side
policy," he said.
Harstad
explained further that the most intuitive benefit from this policy is that
emission is reduced if one buys and conserves deposits. Furthermore, the
coalition finds it cheapest to buy the marginal deposits (ie, deposits that are
not very profitable to exploit, but still quite polluting when consumed). After
selling its marginal deposits, a non-participating country's level of supply
will be less sensitive to changes in the world fuel price. Consequently, there
is no longer carbon leakage on the supply-side, and the coalition can limit its
own supply without fearing that the non-participants will increase theirs.
"This
does the trick," Harstad noted. After purchasing marginal extraction
rights, the coalition implements its ideal policy simply by reducing its
supply, not its demand. Fossil fuel prices are then equalized across countries.
Also, the resulting fossil fuel price seems high enough to motivate even
non-participating countries to invest effectively in new technologies, such as
renewable energy sources. For these reasons, the policy is socially optimal in
the analysis, even if some countries do not participate.
Most
importantly, Harstad said, "The analysis shows that progress on
international climate policy is best achieved by simply utilizing the existing
market for extraction rights."
Multi-national
companies are already trading extraction rights. "Climate coalitions
should, as well," he concluded.
Source:
University of Chicago Press Journals
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